Guindon v. R. – SCC: Leave to appeal granted on whether “advisor penalties” are penal in nature

Bill Innes on Current Tax Cases

http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/bulletins/en/item/4551/index.do New Window

Guindon v. The Queen[1] (March 20, 2014) was a decision granting leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal.  The main issue before the Federal Court of Appeal was whether the Tax Court was correct in holding that advisor penalties under section 163.2 of the Income Tax Act constituted true penal sanctions.  The Federal Court of Appeal held they did not.  The Supreme Court granted leave on this issue (costs in the cause):[2]

The Minister of National Revenue assessed against Ms. Guindon, the applicant, penalties under s. 163.2 of the Income Tax Act in the amount of $546,747, for false statements she made in the context of a charitable donation program. The Minister took the position that Ms. Guindon participated in, assented to or acquiesced in the making of 135 tax receipts she knew, or would reasonably be expected to have known, constituted false statements that could be used by participants in the donation program to claim an unwarranted tax credit under the Income Tax Act. Ms. Guindon appealed the assessment. She argued, among other things, that the third party penalty imposed under s. 163.2 of the Income Tax Act is a provision with true penal consequences and therefore falls within the ambit of s. 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Accordingly, she claimed she should have been entitled to the fundamental substantive and procedural legal rights for which that section provides, such as the right to be presumed innocent, which would raise the burden of proof from proof on a balance of probabilities to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Tax Court accepted Ms. Guindon’s argument and vacated the assessment. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision.

 Earlier on this blog I wrote the following about the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision:

This decision displays a great degree of deference to the administrative apparatus of CRA, e.g., “[c]onduct that is antithetical to the proper functioning of this system”.  While the result of the decision may be correct, it possibly indicates a shift in the jurisprudence of the Federal Court of Appeal in the direction of greater administrative discretion for CRA.

It would be extremely helpful if the Supreme Court agreed to grant leave in order to examine this very important area.

It will be very interesting to see how the Supreme Court deals with this hotly disputed area of tax law.

[1] Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings, March 21, 2014, No. 35519 (the case information on the Supreme Court of Canada site indicates that the order was granted on March 20, 2014).

[2] Id.